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Abstract 
This paper examines the capacity of the Chilean state to respond to the social impact of the 2010 
earthquake and tsunami in the context of the recommendations made by the international literature on 
natural disasters. We examine the impact of the earthquake on social variables, including housing, 
health and education using a dedicated panel survey data. Decades of neoliberal policy have left Chile 
with a skeletal state, which largely administers social policy through targeted and very narrowly focused 
social programmes. The reconstruction effort of the Chilean state largely responded to the emergency 
through these same targeted social policy allocation mechanisms. While official reports on the 
reconstruction effort show a state that is complying with its specified goals, evidence from qualitative 
fieldwork undertaken in the city of Constitución illustrates the extent to which this method proved to be 
highly inadequate in the context of a natural disaster. We conclude by arguing that Chile should 
establish a social policy structure for natural disasters that allows for a rapid response to a social 
emergency based on universal or near universal allocation criteria.  
 
Key Words: Chile, Earthquake and tsunami 2010, public policy for disasters, emergency, 
reconstruction. 
 
1. Introduction 
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Most accounts of the Chilean earthquake of 2010 begin with an enumeration of the losses that it 
caused: the number of lives lost, the percentage of housing lost, and the economic cost of the 
earthquake (CEPAL 2010a; Gobierno de Chile 2011 y 2012; Larrañaga & Herrera, 2010). Analysts argue 
that Chile's material infrastructure withstood the earthquake so well because decades of work on 
building codes and their enforcement have led to earthquake safe constructions (Cámara Chilena de la 
Construcción, 2010; Bitar, 2010). In addition, experts highlight the rapid response of the Chilean 
government to the emergency situation: within one day the country's national highway was 
reconnected so that supplies could be moved up and down the country. Similarly, the international 
airport, which had also been damaged, was operational again within one day to the extent that 
commercial flights resumed after only three days. Despite the initial breakdown suffered by Chile's 
telecommunications network, which severely hampered the government’s response capacity, 
communications were also re-established rapidly, as were electricity and water supplies.1 
By comparison, the social consequences of the earthquake have been studied very little. Questions such 
as whether the earthquake affected poorer and middle class families more than higher income 
households have not yet been analysed in depth. Similarly, changes in employment and labour market 
participation patterns as well as the increase in poverty levels have not been focused on. This article 
therefore asks two central questions: first, what was the impact of the earthquake on Chile's social 
indicators? Second, was Chile’s social policy infrastructure equipped to deal with the scale of the 
disaster?   
It is extremely important to ask these questions in the context of the fact that decades of neoliberal 
policy have left Chile with a skeletal state, which largely administers social policy through targeted and 
very narrowly focused social programmes (Borzutzky, 2002; Solimano, 2012; and Atria et al, 2013). This 
means that housing, health, education, employment and income support are only assigned to people 
who meet a defined “poverty criteria”, and who are considered to be “vulnerable”.2 The problem with 
this approach is that families are judged by quantitative measures and not by the multiple qualitative 
dimensions that define not only poverty, but also vulnerability. In the case of a natural disaster, both the 
poor and the non-poor population are affected. What matters therefore is the overall concept of 
                                                          
1 See Kovacs (2010) and the American Red Cross (2011) for favourable evaluations of Chile’s system of emergency 
response. 
2 A description of the policy instrument used to define who is poor and eligible for a subsidy can be found in 
Herrera et al. (2010). 
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vulnerability and the capability that each family has to overcome the effects of the natural disaster 
(Davis, 1996). In addition, we should note the earthquake and tsunami hit regions that are weaker than 
the Chilean average in terms of their socio-economic indicators, and therefore also less well equipped 
for dealing with the consequences of a natural disaster (CEPAL, 2010 and 2010b).3  
The lessons that we can learn from questioning the appropriateness of Chile's social policy structures in 
general, but specifically for dealing with a natural disaster, are crucial to the country's preparation for 
future socio-natural disasters. In the same way that historic experiences of disaster made Chile think 
about improving its earthquake resistant building codes and construction techniques, the country also 
needs to develop institutional infrastructure and response mechanisms that can deal with the social 
emergencies of earthquakes and other natural disasters, which can be just as devastating as their 
material aspect.4  
In this context, we must, of course, consider that there is a significant overlap between the material 
damage caused by earthquakes and the social dimension. One of the biggest problems after the 2010 
earthquake in Chile was the damage suffered by housing, which is one dimension of social policy.  For 
example, in the six affected regions, 8.8 % of the population suffered damage to their homes or lost 
them completely. This impact was bigger in low-income households, 12% for the poorest quintile, 
because of the precarious quality of their houses and because of their location (Larrañaga, O. & Herrera, 
R., 2010). The key concern here is that reconstruction subsidies and benefits are also allocated according 
to the same point scores that determine access to other social benefits such as income support, and are 
therefore subject to the same narrow and highly focused criteria. In addition, reconstruction subsidies 
for housing were allocated according to the same criteria according to which social housing is normally 
allocated, without any modification of the programmes to the specific conditions generated by the 
earthquake. 
                                                          
3 An analysis of the possible macroeconomic effects of natural disasters indicates that these effects are more 
significant at the regional and local level, even if this is not reflected by a country's average macroeconomic 
indicators (Cavallo y Noy, 2009; Noy, 2009; Dore y Etkin, 2000; Hochrainer, 2009; Raddatz, 2009). In addition, the 
international evidence that natural disasters have negative long-term effects which affect a country's productive 
capacities, its aggregate demand, and physical capabilities (Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Toya y Skidmore, 2007; 
Rasmussen, 2004; Hochrainer, 2009). These effects are stronger in smaller countries such as Chile, but can be 
mitigated by a favourable institutional environment (Jaramillo, 2009).   
4 See Hoffman and Oliver-Smith (2002). 
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This paper is based on the revision of academic and institutional literature on natural disasters and on 
the role of the state in this context. We relate this literature to the Chilean case and to the empirical 
evidence available on the impact of the earthquake and tsunami using data from the 2010 household 
survey, which was specifically designed to capture its impact. In addition, we relate it to the fieldwork 
that we undertook during 2013 in the city of Constitución, where we interviewed civil servants at all 
levels of the public administration (municipal, regional, and central government) who were involved in 
the distribution of social benefits to families affected by the earthquake as well as local residents, who 
were affected by the earthquake and therefore had to deal with the procedures through which benefits 
were allocated.5 This combination of interviews allowed us to gage the ability of the Chilean government 
to respond to the social emergency created by the earthquake. 
This article hopes to contribute to the existing literature on the Chilean earthquake by combining the 
analysis of qualitative interviews with the limited statistics available. The paper proceeds as follows: the 
following section discusses the international literature on natural disasters and how it relates to Chile. 
We then provide an overview of the impact of the earthquake on social indicators. The following section 
of the paper presents an analysis of our fieldwork undertaken. We conclude by arguing that Chile lacks 
an established protocol as well as a social policy infrastructure for dealing with natural disasters. We 
therefore recommend that such an infrastructure should be established to enable a rapid response to 
social emergencies based on universal or near universal allocation criteria in the future. 
 
2. The Role of the State and its Institutions in Dealing with Natural Disasters 
To begin with we must consider the fact that most countries are ill-prepared for dealing with the 
traumatic and destructive consequences of natural disasters. This fact is true for both developed and 
underdeveloped countries, but especially for underdeveloped ones. Governments generally do not 
prioritise policies that prepare for potential natural disasters, and tend to respond only when 
circumstances force them into action. After a catastrophe, public and political attention focuses on the 
                                                          
5 Details on the interviews and focus groups carried out can be found at the end of the bibliography. They were 
carried out during August and September 2013 by members of the Observatorio de la Reconstrucción and the 
Centro de Investigación de Vulnerabilidades y Desastres Socionaturales (CIVDES) both at the Universidad de Chile. 
The principal objective of the fieldwork was to reconstruct the emergency response and reconstruction process 
that followed the earthquake in the city of Constitución, to identify critical junctures in these processes, as well is 
experiences of collaboration and conflict within the city. 
5 
 
mitigation of damages as well as on supporting victims, who acquire a protagonistic role in the media. 
This interest in the disaster and its victims gradually declines in the period following the disaster and 
governments return to the "politics as usual" until the next disaster happens (Birkland, 1996). 
This process also means that planning for potential disasters is often relegated to the backburner. This 
vicious circle is compounded by the fact that governments get little political credit for preventing a 
disaster. In addition, the benefits of having planned an effective response for a natural disaster accrue to 
future governments, and not to those politicians who instituted such a response. However, once a 
disaster occurs, political credit depends on how well a government responds to it (UN, 2002; Pelham et 
al. 2011). 
The international literature has reviewed the experience of different countries with natural disasters 
and has reached a certain consensus about which policies are useful in the prevention of these disasters. 
The literature discusses many different ways of dealing with the emergencies of natural disasters, 
depending, for example, on the socio-economic context of the country, its geographic conditions, and its 
level of institutional development. However, it does come to some degree of consensus on some key 
issues: 
The first is the need to establish risk management systems prior to an emergency occurring. This allows 
policymakers to evaluate and plan response actions before a natural disaster occurs. These emergency 
systems have to be integrated, both amongst each other and with local capacities in the areas of 
finance, administration, and technical support to (Vakis, 2006). As we will see in this paper, while the 
Chilean government has established a basic infrastructure for dealing with natural disasters (such as the 
establishment of a national agency for emergencies, the Oficina Nacional de Emergencia del Ministerio 
del Interior y Seguridad Pública, ONEMI), Chile does not have an established infrastructure for the 
management of risk. The ONEMI is an agency with very limited resources, a limited capacity to 
coordinate risk prevention programs, and no institutional mandate to manage a reconstruction process.6 
The ONEMI’s capacities concentrate principally on organising the emergency response to natural 
disasters.7 
                                                          
6 See Vargas (2002) for recommendations on the different stages of risk prevention. 
7 Historically, the Corporación de Fomento y Reconstrucción (CORFO) was charged with in reconstruction issues 
after the 1939 Chillán earthquake. However, CORFO’s mission has since expanded to broader development issues, 
which has led to the neglect of reconstruction policies. 
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The Cepal (2010b) suggests a risk management model that considers and systematises five fundamental 
aspects: risk assessment, mitigation, better preparation for emergencies, the strengthening of 
institutions, and financing. In this paper, we will argue that the response of the Chilean government to 
the emergency was extremely ad hoc, especially with regard to its social policy responses, particularly as 
they relate to the most vulnerable segments of the population. 
This is an important aspect of the disaster that must be analysed because even when natural disasters 
affect a whole geographic area, the people most affected by them will be low income households, 
especially in less developed countries, where they are generally more exposed to natural disasters 
through the location and quality of their housing. At the same time, low income households dispose of 
fewer means for dealing with the consequences of a disaster. In general, these households are more 
inclined to reduce the consumption of basic goods such as food, health, and education after a 
catastrophe, which only ends up worsening their vulnerability. At the same time it is more likely that the 
poor live in precarious housing built in areas which suffer a greater risk of experiencing a natural 
disaster, which exposes them even more its to its consequences (Vakis, 2006; Fay et al. 2003; Pelham, 
2011). As Valenzuela (2014) has argued, Chile has been much more successful at enforcing earthquake 
resistant construction norms than at enforcing urbanisation policies that prevent construction in 
locations that are likely to be affected by potential natural disasters. 
In addition, lower income households respond differently to risks than higher income households: they 
are more averse to risk on an economic level, but exhibit risky behaviour in terms of their spatial 
orientation, in part due to lack of information about dangerous locations or because the benefits of such 
a location are perceived to be greater than the associated risk of a natural disaster occurring (Fay et al. 
2003). This type of risk can be prevented through an appropriate policy of urbanisation that prevents 
construction in areas that are exposed to natural disasters. 
The measures that can be taken to mitigate the impact of natural disasters on households, particularly 
low income ones, are varied. Building codes for the construction of new buildings and the supervision of 
compliance with them is at the heart of any mitigation strategy. The continuous improvement of existing 
buildings is equally important, as is the establishment of a social protection system that includes 
measures to confront the effects of natural disasters on different population groups (Fay et al. 2003; 
Spence, 2004). As Pelham, Clay and Braunholz argue, natural disasters must be considered in the 
context of the development process, and not as an exogenous event (Pelham et al. 2011). 
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However, it is also the poor who require the most time to recover after a natural disaster, in part due to 
their own lack of resources, but also because of a lack of better public policy that focuses on their needs 
(Fay et al. 2003). 
Vakis (2006) argues that a system of social protection must be considered as an integral part of any risk 
management strategy. In this context, a social protection system can be complementary to and 
synchronised with other emergency response mechanisms, as well as constituting a pre-existing system, 
which can be adapted to the occurrence of unexpected natural disasters, and which has the capacity to 
coordinate efforts from the public, non-public, and private sector. Such a system must also be based on 
a system of analysis and information that allows policymakers to identify clearly the risks to which a 
particular population is subjected, as well as serving as part of a strategy that manages emergency 
situations. 
Most important among the instruments used to ensure social protection in the face of natural disasters 
are monetary transfers. These give households a degree of flexibility in terms of how they spend their 
resources as well as being relatively easy to administer, especially if compared with the distribution of 
actual basic goods (Vakis, 2006).  
Along the same lines, Pelham et al. (2011) suggest social safety nets as a way of confronting natural 
disaster driven risk. The safety nets consist of a containment mechanism, but must be instituted before 
the disaster with clear procedures, that are integrated with the more general social protection system 
that should consist of unconditional transfers of goods or money, and are activated in the case of a 
natural disaster, especially to protect the most vulnerable households. Such mechanisms fulfil an ex-
post role by helping to contain the effects of a natural disaster, but also an ex-ante role in that they can 
help reduce the risks to which low income households are exposed. Pelham et al. cite different countries 
that have implemented safety nets in different ways depending on their particular contexts: for 
example, in Bangladesh response mechanisms to floods and cyclones are pre-planned, and the 
management of this risk is completely integrated with the economic and policy structure of the country. 
Similarly, in Ethiopia, an expandable safety net has been established, which has some permanent 
mechanisms that protect the poorest households on a continuous basis, but that can easily be scaled up 
if the risk of a natural disaster increases. As we will examine in more detail in the research that follows, 
the Chilean government lacked such a system and consequently found it difficult to respond adequately 
to the emergency. 
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The impact of such measures depends greatly on the type of natural disaster as well as on a timely 
identification of those groups of the population who would be the most exposed to a particular type of 
risk. However, most importantly, the success of such an initiative depends on the political will behind 
such a measure (Pelham et al, 2011).  
Another instrument used to mitigate the effects of natural disasters is the institution of emergency 
employment programmes, which generally provide unskilled workers with temporary employment 
opportunities, often in the construction or reconstruction sector. These programmes have the added 
virtue of aiding the reconstruction process after a natural disaster, and act as a countercyclical measure. 
They are also flexible and relatively easy to implement (Vakis, 2006). 
Project based competitive funding is another option that can help address the consequences of natural 
disasters that has several advantages: this funding is flexible and innovative, it can be deployed quickly, 
its administration is relatively simple and autonomous, it represents an opportunity to coordinate 
community organisations and local community leaders with governmental and non-governmental 
agencies, as well as ensuring citizen participation, and presenting an opportunity for creating 
employment for members of the community (Vakis, 2006). However, the application and selection 
procedures for this type of funding have to be simple, effective, and transparent to ensure their 
feasibility as a rapid response mechanism to a natural disaster. 
In Chile, the social policy response to the earthquake did not really follow these international guidelines. 
While the government did institute some minimal employment programs, as well as microcredit 
programs for fishermen in the coastal areas, one of the principal tools through which it allocated 
reconstruction aid was through a mechanism called the Ficha de Proteccion Social (FPS, the Social 
Protection Form), which is based on principles of targeted rather than universal benefits, and generally 
does not contemplate the option of cash transfers. 
The origins of the FPS relate to the many ways in which Chile's neoliberal military regime reduced the 
role of the state, in part by privatising social security provisions. This eliminated any aspiration to 
establish universal social rights that previous governemts had (Borzutzky, 2002; Solimano, 2012; and 
Illanes and Riesco, 2007). The replacement of social security systems that shared risk among their 
beneficiaries with privatised systems and minimal state guarantees was accompanied by the concept of 
rigourous targeting: those individuals not covered by the new privatised social policies would receive a 
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minimum level of benefit from the state.8 To determine whether an individual was eligible for a 
potential benefit, a social worker would visit the household to undertake a survey of its general 
situation, called a Ficha CAS, which would translate a household’s level of need into a point score. Based 
on this score, benefits would be assigned. 
Since then the Ficha CAS has been replaced by a more modern version called the Ficha de Proteccion 
Social (FPS, the Social Protection Form), which takes into account a household’s capability to generate 
income (Herrera et al., 2010). The FPS no longer focuses on unfulfilled basic needs relative to a 
minimum standard (e.g. the materials and quality of housing, whether a household possesses a 
television, refrigerator or telephone, and who is employed and the income level of the family), but 
instead asked questions about the number and age of family members, their educational level, and their 
employment situation in order to calculate an overall point score that expresses the level of economic 
risk to which a family is exposed as well is its ability to confront such risks. This new conceptualisation of 
poverty is considered more dynamic than previous measures, and theoretically is based on the 
capability approach (Herrera et al., 2010). 
Whatever the criticisms of such a mechanism for targeting social policies may be (and there are many), a 
mechanism such as the FPS most certainly is not an appropriate tool for allocating benefits in the wake 
of a natural disaster. However, in the years following the 2010 earthquake, the FPS became one of the 
main social policy instruments used to deal with the consequences of the earthquake and tsunami. This 
method contrasts sharply with the recommendations for universal benefits made by the international 
literature, which is discussed above. However, in the absence of a social policy infrastructure specifically 
designed for dealing with the consequences of natural disasters, the consensus among policymakers in 
Chile at the time was to use established policy instruments for dealing with the reconstruction process, 
rather than experimenting with new and untested policies. 
However, in public discussions of the reconstruction process, it also became clear that policymakers 
responsible for the reconstruction process never questioned the decision to apply policy tools designed 
for the allocation of social benefits under normal circumstances in a disaster situation. It is in these 
discussions were the impact of decades of viewing the state as a subsidiary provider of last resort 
                                                          
8 In addition to being targeted, these benefits were also restricted in their number, which created a system of 
"cupos” (roughly translated as a quota). Potential beneficiaries had to apply for benefits and would be put on a 
waiting list to receive them. If a cupo did not become available for them, they would not receive the benefit, thus 
waiting indefinitely. 
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becomes clear: public policy experts become so used to established patterns of policy-making and 
benefit allocation, that they do not question these patterns. In particular, this means that public 
solutions to private issues are generally not considered, or only considered as a measure of last resort.9 
In fact, the only self-criticism that policymakers put forward during interviews and at public events with 
regard to the reconstruction process was that they had generated unrealistically high expectations 
among the population affected by the disaster by promising rapid and efficient solutions to housing 
problems, which they were then unable to deliver. 10  
 
 
3. The impact of the earthquake on well-being and the standard of living of the 
affected population 
Understanding both the long-term and short-term impact of the 2010 earthquake and tsunami on the 
affected regions in Chile has not been an easy task. Affected communities had a difficult time in the 
period immediately following the disaster with establishing precise statistics on the extent to which their 
material infrastructure (including private housing) had been damaged. Even more difficult was 
ascertaining the impact of the disaster on the labour market, on the population's health, and on other 
aspects of the social devastation of the earthquake has caused. As a result, different government 
agencies produced widely differing statistics on the damage caused by the earthquake, which in some 
cases were vastly inflated by the pressures exerted by local communities to declare the greatest possible 
extent of damage with the objective of obtaining the greatest possible share of reconstruction 
resources.  
                                                          
9 This issue is discussed in detail by Atria et al. (2013). One example that the book gives is the fact that when 
policymakers began to think about reforming Santiago’s bus system (which later became known as Transsantiago), 
they did not even consider the possibility of establishing a public transportation system, but instead worked with a 
fragmented private system in which multiple providers need to be regulated and monitored. 
10 This statement is based on a presentation made by the Undersectary of Housing, Andrés Iacobelli, on the 27th 
November 2012 during the third session of the Plataforma Regional para la Reducción de Desastres en Las 
Amércias (UNISDR) in Santiago. On 25th September 2013, Andres Gil Santa Cruz, at the time the oordinator of the 
National Reconstruction Programme, during a debate at the Universidad de Los Andes, made the same point. 
Neither of the two representatives of the government at the time in any way questioned the use of normal policy 
tools during a post-disaster situation. 
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In fact, both the data on the disaster’s original damage as well as subsequent data on the reconstruction 
process were so confusing that the Bachelet administration which assumed office in March of 2014 had 
to commission a special delegate, Paula Fortes, who was then charged with preparing a report on the 
state of the reconstruction efforts, as well as with generating a new roadmap for the reconstruction 
process going forward. The report concludes: “the official data available lack updating and correct 
referencing; the data is inconsistent, incomplete, and measurement standards differ within the same 
sector; multiple instruments exist that register damage, but that do not "converse" with each other, 
which results in differences between communal, regional, and national data that surpass any 
fluctuations that could be explained through statistical error” (Ministerio del Interior, 2014). 
Given these statistical problems, we have used data from a specific survey, the Encuesta Post Terremoto 
(ETP), which the Ministry of Social Development undertook in the regions of Valparaíso, Metropolitana, 
Libertador Bernardo O’Higgins, Maule, Bíobío y Araucanía, to understand the extent of the social 
emergency that the earthquake and tsunami generated. The EPT gathered data during May and June of 
2010 from 22.456 households, which represents a subset of the sample surveyed by Chile's regular 
household survey, the Encuesta Casen. This makes the EPT a longitudinal survey with two applications, 
one in 2009 and another in 2010. The survey is representative both nationally and regionally. 
Due to its design as a panel survey, the EPT allows us to analyse how the well-being of the population 
was affected by the earthquake and tsunami. Although well-being is a very broad concept, the survey 
includes many variables that enable us to study a broad range of issues, including those pertaining to 
the concept of multidimensional poverty. Here, we present data on housing, health, education, income 
levels and employment. 
According to the information gathered by the EPT, one of the most dramatic consequences of the 
earthquake was the damage to and destruction of housing. According to the EPT, approximately 8.8% of 
the population living in the affected areas experienced either major damage or the complete 
destruction of their houses. In the three regions most affected by the earthquake, Libertador Bernardo 
O’Higgins, Maule y Bíobío, the percentage of people affected was even greater at 17.3%. Predictably, 
the impact of the earthquake on the housing of low income households was the highest. On average, 
12% of the households in the lowest income quintile lost their homes compared with 4.6% in the highest 
income quintile. The higher rate of damage among lower income households can partly be explained by 
the low quality and precariousness of the housing itself, and partly can be attributed to the fact that 
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they are built in areas that are subject to greater risk. The earthquake left poorer households doubly 
affected: not only did they suffer greater damage, but they also have no resources of their own with 
which to confront the damage incurred. In addition, people with low income levels are not insured 
against the risk of earthquakes, and are therefore wholly unprotected in the face of a potential disaster. 
Another area in which the post-earthquake household survey showed a significant impact is mental 
health. The survey incorporated the Davidson Trauma Scale that measures both the symptoms and the 
severity of post-traumatic stress disorder in people who were affected by natural disaster. Even three 
months after the 2010 earthquake, 12% of the population in the affected regions (based on the 
percentage of people who responded to the service module on psychosocial impact) suffered symptoms 
associated with post-traumatic stress. This percentage was again much higher in the three regions most 
affected, where it varied between one fifth and one fourth of the population. Post-traumatic stress was 
also more prevalent among people from lower income households, either because they were more 
affected by the earthquake in terms of its material impact, or because they are less likely to be treated 
for the symptoms. 
The EPT also measured the effect of the earthquake and tsunami on the education of children in the 
affected regions. The measure used was whether or not the beginning of the school year was delayed 
until the 1st of April. Delays affected 24.6% of schoolchildren in the six regions where the earthquake 
caused the most damage, a proportion that increases to 70% in the three regions that were most 
affected (Libertador Bernardo O’Higgins, Maule y Bíobío). It is interesting to note that schools in these 
regions were relatively equally affected by the earthquake, regardless of whether they catered to high 
or low income households. 
If we look at the earthquake’s effect on poverty levels, the EPT shows that between its two applications 
in 2009 and 2010, 10.5% of households fell below the poverty line while 7.4% rose above it. This 
generated a net increase in poverty at the national level from 16.4% to 19.4%, if we consider the 
population included in both rounds of the survey. However, there are two reasons why we should be 
cautious in interpreting poverty levels, first, because longitudinal data is less precise, and second, 
because the data compares the situations of households in November/December to April/May. This 
prevents us from isolating the effect of the earthquake on the income of individuals and households as 
these fluctuate with the seasons according to the level of activity in particular sectors of the economy, 
particularly agriculture and construccion. 
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Despite these limitations, the survey provides us with valuable information regarding the characteristics 
of households that suffered poverty between 2009 and 2010. People who were poor at both moments 
in time to a large extent (41%) were households headed by women with an average of 8.7 years of 
education. By contrast, households that were not poor when the surveys were taken were generally 
headed by men and averaged 10.6 years of education.11 
If we analyse variables associated with the labour market, we can perceive important differences which 
explain why some households are more likely than others to fall below the poverty line. Households that 
overcame poverty between 2009 and 2010 increased their labour market participation from 1.14 to 1.68 
workers on average, while people who fall below the poverty line present a decline in their participation 
rates from 1.74 to 1.14. Following the same logic, households whose income levels did not change did 
not experience a change in their labour market participation.  
From this brief overview, we can see that the earthquake and tsunami had a significant impact in the 
affected regions on many dimensions of the population’s standard of living. First and foremost, was the 
material damage suffered in terms of housing and infrastructure (including hospitals and educational 
establishments). As the following section will illustrate, the government’s social policies responded 
primarily to these issues. Effects such as loss of employment, lower labour market participation, 
increased poverty levels and the significant effects of psychological stress where not – or were barely – 
addressed by public policies. As regards the loss of employment, there were, for example some minor 
employment programs (including some small microcredit programmes for fishermen, who had lost their 
boats), but the government mainly relied on the reconstruction effort itself to deal with the 
unemployment generated by the earthquake.12  
 
 
                                                          
11 Sanhueza, Contreras y Denis (2011) analysed the effects of the earthquake based on a difference on difference 
methodology for five dimesions of well-being: education, health, housing, income an employment. They used the 
Alkire and Foster (2007) methodology to construct an aggregate indicator of multidimensional poverty focused on 
specific age groups (children, adults and the elderly). They found that the earthquake negatively affects children in 
terms of the aggregate multidimensional poverty levels of households, while older people are affected in the 
dimension of health. 
12 Issues of post-traumatic stress, even though the data shows that this is where the earthquake had a significant 
impact, were not addressed in any way by specific public policies. 
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4. Chile’s Social Policy Reponses to the Earthquake: The response of a 
neoliberal, subsidiary state 
While the previous section described the multiple dimensions of the social emergency created by the 
2010 earthquake and tsunami, this section will analyse the response of government institutions to the 
situation. This response can be divided into two phases: the first was the immediate response to the 
earthquake, and consisted principally of the distribution of emergency aid (water, food and fuel) as well 
as organising emergency housing shelters. The second phase began approximately one month after the 
emergency with the planning of reconstruction, which in the sphere of social policy dealt mainly with 
the re-establishment of schools and hospitals, as well as with the rebuilding of housing.  
Despite the fact that Chile is a seismic country where people are generally quite well-informed about 
basic emergency protocols, the scale of the 2010 earthquake and tsunami was nevertheless unexpected, 
and the country proved to be ill-prepared in terms of its capacity to respond to its immediate 
consequences. Since communication facilities were interrupted, the affected regions were left in a state 
of complete uncertainty, as their local municipal administrations could not communicate with their staff, 
and were cut off from both regional and central government emergency institutions. As a result, there is 
a widespread consensus that the initial public response to the earthquake was both ad hoc and chaotic.  
Our interviews with municipal and local officials illustrate this point: they were ill equipped to provide 
help in any systematic way and had to respond to the crisis spontaneously, prioritising the most urgent 
needs of the moment, so that during the first days people had to survive with their own and their 
community’s limited resources. 
One inhabitant of Constitución’s Cerro O´Higgins stated that: “the earthquake was on the 27th February, 
the mayor and one person from the municipality showed up on the 30th. Although they knew from the 
beginning what had happened to us, because the next day they listed the people who had died. But 
nobody came from the municipality to ask us what we needed, how we were, nothing. They arrived on 
the 30th.”13   
It was in this context that neighbourhoods and communities spontaneously organised themselves 
collectively, and organized meetings to attend the most urgent needs of the community, such as finding 
accommodation for people who had lost their houses, obtaining food, water, and basic supplies, 
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enforcing security in the neighbourhood, or organizing meetings with the local authorities in the hope of 
accelerating the assignation of subsidies.  
"At first it was every day, every day we met in the morning, in fact this is how I got to be a community 
leader  ... where I felt more engaged, and began to talk about what could be done to fix things, what we 
were going to do, where… placing homeless people with  the less afected neighbors, thinking about how 
to help children to cope with this situation." (Neighbour, Cerro O``Higgins)14 
In terms of social participation, the EPT shows that 21.9% of heads of households in the Maule region, 
and 36.9% in the Bíobío region implemented collective strategies to deal with the problems generated 
by the earthquake and tsunami. This social capital became a very relevant factor in the process that 
organised the emergency response to the earthquake. However, local governments did not have the 
ability to capitalise on this level of grassroots organization, nor to engage it in a sustained dialogue or 
programme for action.15 
Municipal officials, on the other hand, express their own helplessness in the face of the overwhelming 
disaster. One interviewee from the regional ministerial housing service (SERVIU), in charge of 
implementing housing reconstruction explained:  
“That's why I'm saying, the subject of reconstruction, where we failed as a ministry and as a country, … 
we don't have a protocol for this sort of stuff. Because sometimes the river floods, and everything 
collapses (queda la escoba), the volcano and everything collapses (queda la escoba), the tsunami and 
everything collapses (queda la escoba). I think that there is no protocol, so you have to act on the hop, 
and often acting on the hop takes a lot of time, because you have to start asking a lot of questions.” 16 
This view is echoed by officials from the central government, who expressed a similar level of 
overwhelm: 
“I think that as a country we lack a logic of formal protocols. The whole thing worked on a case-by-case 
basis. Almost like if there was a good relationship between the mayor of the moment and the 
municipality’s housing staff with the regional or central government, then everything worked well. In 
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other cases, if they didn't get on with whoever, then it didn't.” (Representative of the Ministry of 
Housing, Santiago)17 
In general terms, the municipal administration was the institution that organised the emergency 
response to the disaster, while the central government and its regional agencies took on a more active 
role in the reconstruction process, which basically consisted of housing and infrastructure 
reconstruction. Municipal officials interviewed in the city of Constitución stated that the most important 
work consisted of surveying the damage caused by the earthquake, distributing food and clothing, 
organising emergency housing, providing emotional support to neighbours, and even managing a 
makeshift morgue. Many people appreciated the rapid response of local officials, who often deferred 
their own needs in order to help affected neighbours first. The level of commitment of municipal 
officials in the emergency situation was highly valued, even when people described the lack of 
organisation in the response to the emergency during the first few days. The chaos is reflected in the 
comment of one municipal official from DIDECO (the Direccon de Desarrollo Comunitario), who said:  
“Well, in reality, I could tell you about four or five functions that were clear, but at the same time they 
were also diffuse, because there was so much demand for everything and from everybody that things 
were difficult. For example, I can tell you specifically that during the first days even though I was in 
charge of education, the next day, I was in charge of the transitional morgue, or in charge of distributing 
water. I was also involved in distributing food. We ended up giving out 21,000 daily rations. …  I took on 
the job, I think, even though it didn't correspond to what I was supposed to be doing.”18 
The high demand for emergency housing, the shutdown of basic services, increased levels of insecurity 
and the generalised panic meant that municipal services were completely overwhelmed by the 
challenges of managing the situation. In addition, a lack of coordination and direction meant that many 
resources received from NGOs and international organisations often did not correspond to the 
immediate needs of the population, or did not reach the population in a timely manner due to the 
existence of an established protocol for emergency situations. 
The confusion and helplessness at the municipal level was compounded by the fact that the earthquake 
occurred just two weeks before a change in government. Municipal officials complained that after the 
handover they lost their networks in the public administration: 
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“Before the handover, you knew who to call. We all had networks that extended to other communities, 
and to the regional government. Even to people in Santiago. But when Piñera took over, everything 
changed. Many positions weren’t even filled. You didn't know who to call to get anything done. It was a 
mess. All new people. And they were clueless. You have no idea how this slowed things down.” 
(Municipal official in charge of planning)19 
The qualitative evidence discussed here presents a dramatic situation: the only institution in charge of 
managing natural disaster risk as well is post-disaster emergency efforts in Chile is the ONEMI. From the 
perspective of the inhabitants of Constitutión, these emergency efforts were uncoordinated, ineffective 
and basically chaotic. In reality, the emergency was dealt with spontaneously by local actors. Once the 
immediate emergency situation had been overcome, the usual state institutions and instruments were 
used to administrate the reconstruction process. It is during this process that the need for a dedicated 
institutional infrastructure for post-emergency situations became clear. 
For instance, one of the most complicated policy issues after the earthquake was the question of how to 
select the beneficiaries of the various reconstruction programs that were instituted, especially those 
related to housing destroyed by the earthquake and tsunami. This is where the discussion of targeted 
benefits in an emergency situation becomes very relevant as most of the programmes directed at the 
reconstruction of housing required the existence of an FPS, the household survey discussed in section 2 
of this paper.  
The first problem with this system of allocation was that not every household affected by the 
earthquake also had an updated FPS. And updating existing surveys or undertaking new ones is too 
time-consuming in an emergency situation where social services are already stretched to the limit in 
terms of their administrative capacity (assuming that this administrative capacity has not been 
destroyed by the earthquake). Yet one senior representative at the Ministry of Housing defended the 
use of the FPS by arguing that the majority of Chilean households have been interviewed for an FPS, so 
that this information was readily available:  
 “Many of these families didn't have an FPS, but the majority did. In Chile, there are about 5 million 
households 3.8 million of which are covered by the FPS. If you look at this by quintile, it's pretty obvious: 
the first quintile is almost fully fully covered by the FPS, almost 100%, and after that the proportion 
declines. In the fifth quintile it's pretty low. .... The FPS wasn't really a limitation, because in the cases 
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where people didn't have it, we worked on a case by case basis. It wasn't a limiting factor for us in 
getting to lower middle-class or middle-class families who did not have the FPS.”20  
According to government sources, the allocation of housing through the FPS was complemented by 
other programs directed at households, which were not registered in the FPS system. However, in 
practical terms, families which had not applied for any form of state benefits or aid prior to the 
earthquake, had to overcome a series of obstacles to access reconstruction programmes. Many argued 
that the time period during which people could apply for housing subsidies was too short if you consider 
that many people who needed help were excluded from this process because they did not have a pre-
existing FPS. One employee from the municipal administration confirms:  
 “People would say: "I can't apply, I suffered damage but I was living with so-and-so", and that's where 
the problem happened with the FPS. They simply didn't have their own form. So they had no right or 
simply didn't go to the housing department so that they could analyse the state of their housing, and 
declare them inhabitable. From there you had to go to the SERPLAC (Regional Secretary for planification 
and coordination) so that they would emit a certificate of damage. So a lot of people didn’t know what 
to do. Then they went back to housing with a certificate of inhabitability, they'd come here and say: 
“look, here I have my certificate of inhabilitability, but I can't apply….., By then the application deadline 
had passed, and that's when they’d find out that they had to go to the SERPLAC.” (Municipal official from 
Constitución)21  
This administrative chaos is also reflected in the comments of the beneficiaries of the system:  
“No, no, no. There were tons of people doing surveys, who came from the municipality and from the 
government, the definitely it was all completely disorganized. In the sector of La Poza, people know the 
benefit system, they know which doors to knock-on, they know what a DIDECO is. So there were people 
who knew how this worked and they moved very well, but there were loads of people who never in their 
life [applied for a benefit], who've always worked and have always bought stuff with their own efforts 
who didn't know anything. So they were abandoned” (Interview with the local coordinator of the MNRJ-
Movimiento por una Reconstrucción Justa, Movement for a fair reconstruction)22 
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The complaints about the housing benefit programmes also extended to the question of whether the 
available resources were allocated fairly. One woman from Villa Verde, for example, said:  
“For example there are lots of people who were left out, I know of two women, who are the same as me. 
They live off their wage and nothing else. And here you see quite a few people who have two cars. Here 
in our passage, hear my neighbours have two tremendous cars, stupendous. That is, you can tell they're 
not for this kind of housing, so how the hell did they end up here? She's a policewoman. I don't know how 
much a policewoman earns, she's really well off, and everyone looks at her thinking mmmm.”23 
This qualitative appreciation of the allocation of funding coincides perfectly with the more rigourous 
analysis carried out of this topic by the Presidential Delegation for Reconstruction, which concluded: 
"the FPS became the main door through which beneficiaries could go to obtain support. In this context, 
innumerable reports from the affected population highlight the lack of rigour in its application. This 
situation has been recognised by the current government." (Delegación Presidencial, 2014)24  
In addition, the circumstances of families change abruptly as a result of such a natural disaster. These 
changes can produce two different results: families can lose everything, including their jobs, which 
evidently deteriorates their point scores, and makes them more eligible for benefits. On the other hand 
very poor families who are assigned new housing may increase their point scores, simply because 
households have been split as a result of the earthquake leading to a situation where fewer families live 
in a single dwelling, but in which each household has much less disposable income. The latter situation 
can lead to the perverse result that a household is poorer after receiving a housing benefit than 
before.25 To prevent this from happening, the government decided to freeze point scores obtained 
through the FPS and maintain them at pre-earthquake levels.26 
However, in addition to the problems relating to fairness of allocation, observers of the reconstruction 
process also highlight another complicated aspect of using an instrument such as the FPS for a post-
disaster reconstruction process. They highlight that the FPS is an instrument that is applied by 
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municipalities at the local level. One of the problems that they observed relating to its application is that 
municipal administrations tended to inflate the damage that their communities had incurred, as this 
would increase the funds they would receive from the central government from reconstruction. 
Members of the municipal administration would then use these funds to obtain political support from 
their voters, thus engaging in clientilistic politics that would exacerbate the lack of transparency and 
fairness in the allocation of funds.27 
All of these problems introduce new criticisms regarding the effectiveness of the FPS as an instrument 
for evaluating the vulnerability of families, especially in the face of risk factors that are unexpected such 
as those of natural disasters, and brings us back to the recommendation of the international literature 
on disasters discussed above, which argues that monetary transfers are the most efficient instrument 
for ensuring the social protection of people affected by a natural disaster (Vakis, 2006).   
Another weakness that must be mentioned in the context of the Chilean earthquake and tsunami is the 
lack of coordination between those institutions dealing with its impact, as well as the lack of 
empowerment of local institutions, both in terms of their actual capacities (quantity and 
professionialism of their staff) as well as their capability to make independent decisions (Mella, 2011). 
As discussed above, this process was compounded by the change of government in the middle of the 
emergency situation. 
In the Constitución area, the inefficiency of the public administration in resolving the problems of 
reconstruction, which was compounded by the requirement to pass through an established filter for 
social policy targeting such as the FPS, contrasts sharply with the role that the private sector played in 
helping affected communities. In particular, the company Celulosa Arauco, which is one of the main 
forestry conglomerates in the Bío Bío region, participated in the reconstruction. Arauco was the main 
private funder of Constitucións reconstruction plan (Plan de Reconstrucción Sustentable), as has been 
documented in detail by Tironi (2014). However, Arauco only funded to the elaboration of the plan, 
while the government funded investment in reconstruction itself (Ministerio del Interior, 2014). 
Neighbours, government officials and also Arauco employees recognize that the company played a 
fundamental role in the first post-earthquake attention. According to one of its employees, the company 
took a leading role in collecting the debris, brought food and appliances not only for its people but for 
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the general population, donated land for the construction of new houses and worked closely with the 
municipal administration to respond to the first needs of the community. This support was highly valued 
by the residents but also originated some conflicts. For example, a piece of land was donated by the 
company under the condition that half of the houses built had to be for Arauco employees affected by 
the catastrophe, and the other half could be distributed among the rest of the neighbours. The 
difference between those who worked for Arauco and those who did not (in socioeconomic terms, as 
well as in lifestyle and custom) generated a series of problems of coexistence that remain until today. 
However, the help provided by Arauco also raised suspicions about their real interests among the 
community. Tironi, for example, relates the extent to which local residents were sceptical of the 
company's motives, which they considered to be a form of "image laundering" by a firm that had 
"ruined a once fine seaside resort”and caused widespread environmental devastation in the area 
(Tironi, 2014). In our interviews, one community leader from the El Dique sector argued: 
“Yes, Arauco is mixed up in all this. … If you look carefully, there are lots of things where Arauco has 
invested money, like in the football field … that was built by Arauco who then gave it to the municipality. 
They're building a cultural centre, Arauco is also in on that one. They will begin to build a library, also 
Arauco. So there's a lot of stuff where Arauco is involved…. But in reality what they're interested in is the 
road, in expanding the road, making it wider for the transport of wood. We all know that that's the 
reality. Arauco’s involved in that too."28 
Other private or non–governmental organisations also participated in the reconstruction process and 
filled gaps in the public provision of goods. However, these entities acted independently, and dealt with 
those needs of the population that they considered to be more important. Among the most mentioned 
organizations are Un Techo para Chile (an NGO working on housing policies), Celco (a Wood and Pulp 
Plant belong to Celulosa Arauco), the Red Cross, some universities, and Desafío Levantemos Chile (an 
NGO directed by the businessman and philanthropist Felipe Cubillos) who personally spoke with 
neighbours of Constitución and offered quick solutions for specific problems. Respondents point out 
that private organizations in general had the ability to respond quickly and appropriately to the most 
pressing population needs, as opposed to the Government where the processes were delayed by 
bureaucracy and inefficiencies.  
                                                          
28  
22 
 
“After a few telephone calls, I got hold of his number, I called him [Felipe Cubillos] quite a few times, like 
11 times, he answered, he was in Pelluhue, okay he said, let's get together in such and such a place in 
Constitución. That's when I met him, we greeted each other and he said: “Which school was destroyed?” 
We went to see the school, which is the Enrique Donn school, and he said to me: “And where do we put a 
modular school?” And we went to the place, and after half an hour he said: “Okay this is where we put 
the modular school.” … Much quicker, that is, imagine, in half an hour and he decided all these things…. 
And after that it's a well-known story. On 27 April, if I remember correctly, around that time they 
inaugurated the modular school, with a capacity for 1000 students, because Felipe understood that if the 
the children had a place to go to, where they could eat and be looked after during the whole day, it 
would give parents the chance to rebuild their house, get rid of the debris etc etc.” (Municipal official, 
formerly in the Dideco division)29 
In summary, the qualitative evidence produced by our field work in Constitución allows us to track the 
development of the institutional response of different levels of government in the face of the disaster: 
at first, there was a delayed response from both local and regional institutions. Once these institutions 
began to act, their actions were uncoordinated, ad hoc, and generally demonstrated a degree of 
overwhelm that is indicative of the extent of the disaster. The problems of institutional coordination 
were compounded by the effects of the change in government, and also affected negatively the 
subsequent allocation of social benefits, particularly in the area of housing and local reconstruction. 
 
6. Conclusions  
Before drawing conclusions about the Chilean government's response to the 2010 earthquake and 
tsunami, we should emphasise how difficult it is for governments to respond to natural disasters of this 
magnitude. Even developed countries would have suffered severe consequences and struggled with 
such circumstances. The experience of the United States with hurricane Katrina in 2005 illustrates how 
difficult it is to cope with natural disasters, both in terms of the immediate disaster response and the 
subsequent reconstruction process.30 Given the magnitude of the 2010 earthquake and tsunami, we 
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must conclude that Chile is very well prepared for natural disasters in terms of preventing material 
damage. The establishment and effective enforcement of appropriate earthquake resistant building 
codes meant that Chile’s infrastructure and housing generally held up very well during the earthquake. 
This illustrates the strength of Chile’s institutions and the capacity of the state for regulating and 
enforcing legislation when political will and attention is directed towards a particular issue. This is a very 
important conclusion as the policies that prevent material damage save lives and also contain the social 
emergencies that follow a natural disaster. 
However, Chile is much less well-equipped for dealing with the slower and more time-consuming 
reconstruction process that follows a natural disaster. Probably the only exception to this rule is the 
state’s efficiency in reconstructing public infrastructure, in particular as it relates to transportation 
(airports, ports, and roads) and utilities (water, electricity, and fuel supplies). The state is much less 
efficient, however, at urban reconstruction as it relates to both individual housing and urban renewal or 
planning.  
The institutional structures that complicate such a reconstruction process relate first to the way in which 
the Chilean state itself is organised, and second to the way in which it structures social policy. 
Regarding its organisation, the post-disaster coping strategies highlighted two important aspects of the 
Chilean state: first, accounts of how local institutions coped with the earthquake and subsequent 
reconstruction process illustrate that they are ill-equipped for dealing with an emergency at the local 
and regional level as they are not empowered to act independently of the central government, and also 
lack independent resources.   
Second, the complications generated by a change in the central and regional governments during the 
period immediately following the earthquake illustrate the need for a permanent and independent civil 
service structure. At present civil servants in leading positions at all levels of government, but even more 
particularly so at the local and regional level, are appointed according to political criteria, and often also 
according to the role they played in the most recent local elections, rather than according to their actual 
capacities and administrative experience and capability (Sehnbruch and Siavelis, 2014). A change in 
government therefore breaks the hierarchical order and command structure within and between 
different levels of government as the new authorities usher in their own political appointees. As the 
evidence from the qualitative interviews showed, the negative consequences of such a situation in a 
reconstruction process significantly slow things down. 
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Over the long term, however, the success of a post-disaster reconstruction process depends on the 
ability of the state to administer reconstruction funds through its regional and local administrations. It is 
here that we can observe the biggest contrast between the expectations of the population and the 
state's ability to deliver. From the qualitative interviews cited during the course of this paper, we can 
clearly observe that the Chilean population expects the state to help individual families overcome the 
consequences of a natural disaster. Thus, the people interviewed for this paper expected the state to 
provide alternative housing, funds for reconstruction, as well as other benefits in the shape of either 
monetary transfers, employment, or the delivery of emergency rations of food and water. This means 
that the population expected public rather than private help. In the cases where private help was 
forthcoming, local residents contrasted its delivery positively with the slower and more cumbersome 
arrangements made by local administrations. 
It is in this slower and time-consuming reconstruction process that Chile's inability to respond 
adequately to the social policy emergency generated by any natural disaster must be highlighted: first, 
some social problems, such as reduced labour force participation, increased unemployment and poverty 
levels, as well as the more complex need for post-disaster psychological support were simply ignored or 
left unaddressed by public policy. This created a general sense of deprivation among the population that 
compounded the problems associated with the material loss of housing. 
Second, the fact that the state used established mechanisms for benefit allocation in those social policy 
areas where it did intervene points to a lack of institutional preparation and planning for social 
emergencies.That these mechanisms were furthermore based on the idea of targeted social policy 
despite the emergency situation illustrates the extent to which the Chilean state still functions according 
to the logic established by a neoliberal regime many decades ago. In particular, this logic ignores the fact 
that not only the poor are vulnerable in a natural disaster situation. Higher income groups, in particular 
Chile’s emerging middle class is equally vulnerable. Yet the targeted approach to reconstruction benefits 
by definition excludes the middle class. 
That public officials did not question the logic of targeting resources in a post-disaster situation shows 
that this logic has become part of the government’s DNA. This also explains why the Chilean state has 
not invested in expanding and preparing its institutions at all levels for a potential social emergency, and 
why it has not established an alternative regime for allocating social benefits in an emergency situation.  
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This kind of institutional arrangement has historically never existed in Chile: as we saw above, while the 
state has invested in enforcing strict earthquake resistant building codes, it has never had the capability 
for adequately dealing with the reconstruction process that must follow a natural disaster. So while we 
are dealing with an atrophied state that was born out of a neoliberal legacy, we are also dealing with a 
modern state that has not invested adequately in its own development. The expectations of the Chilean 
population therefore significantly outpaced the capabilities of the Chilean state. 
Some important and urgent lessons must therefore be learned from the 2010 earthquake and tsunami, 
particularly because the same mechanisms for allocating reconstruction benefits that were described in 
this paper have again been used following the 2014 earthquake and tsunami in the northern region of 
Iquique, which registered 8.2 on the Richter scale and displaced 80,000 people. Evidence from 
interviews carried out by the Observatory of Reconstruction indicate that the affected population is 
experiencing the same level of administrative confusion and delays in the reconstruction process as the 
population of Consitución did in the years following 2010.31 
A future social policy infrastructure for natural disasters should consider the recommendations made by 
the international literature, which as a first emergency response suggests establishing cash transfers for 
victims of natural disasters that can be disembursed rapidly. A second level of institutional response 
must focus on preventing poverty and falls in the employment participation rate. This means organising 
the reconstruction effort with labour force participation in mind, and not simply leaving the allocation of 
jobs to the markets, which particularly affects women, who often leave the labour force following an 
emergency situation and do not want to work in reconstruction.  
A third level of institutional infrastructure must deal with the material destruction at the household 
level. Procedures for reconstruction grants and loans should be simplified: a single certificate of damage 
should automatically entitle households to benefits rather that the endless bureaucratic procedures that 
currently characterise this process. 
In addition to considering the institutional post-disaster infrastructure, the Chilean government should 
also consider how earthquake insurance can be expanded to middle class and low-income households. 
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Insurance should be compulsory and state backed for all households, and not just for those which have 
taken on private mortgages.  
That Chile has the capability to establish better post-disaster institutional infrastructure is evident from 
the fact that the country has successfully implemented and enforced strict earthquake resistant building 
codes. The same institutional effort should now go into setting up a better procedures for post-
emergency and reconstruction process is. 
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A note on the fieldwork undertaken for this paper  
The interviews for this paper were undertaken in the city of Constitución(VII Region), which was 
selected because of the extent of the damage that the city experienced as a result of both the 
earthquake and tsunami due to its coastal location. Most of these interviews were carried out 
in Constitución itself during 2013 by the Reconstruction Observatory (Observatorio de la 
Reconstrucción) established the University of Chile.   
 
Interviewee Number Location Date 
Interview of housing ministry representative 
with a high level of responsibility   
1 Santiago Mayo, 2014 
Interview of research are specialised on the 
subjects of Reconstruction and urban planning  
1 Santiago Mayo, 2014 
Interviews with neighbours and community 
leaders 
11 Constitución 2013 
Interviews with representatives from the 
municipal administration  
2 Constitución 2013 
Interviews with representatives from regional 
government agencies (SERVIU, SERPLAC) 
2 Constitución 2013 
Interview with representative of a large 
company in the region  
1 Constitución 2013 
TOTAL 18 
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